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Abstract: 
It has been 26 years since Mongolia transitioned to democracy. I decided to 
evaluate the progress of Mongolia’s development since the transition to evaluate whether 
the country of only 3 million people with vast land and natural resources successfully 
implemented policies to attain growth and societal wellbeing. In order to evaluate 
Mongolia’s development progress, this thesis uses FDI in Mongolian development since 
1990 as a case study to examine the relationship between FDI, state development 
strategies, and development outcomes. My research questions encompass a series of 
interrelated inquiries including 1) whether human development can be achieved through 
extraction industries 2) whether the source of FDI has a strong impact on development 
outcomes, and 3) whether FDI influences state-led development efforts and decision 
making to the extent that it threatens the development of Mongolian sovereignty. 
I conclude that Mongolia is at a crossroads. Foreign direct investment in the 
extraction industry can either help or harm Mongolian development; the long-term results 
of FDI will depend upon the Mongolian government’s actions. The source of the FDI 
does not have a strong impact on development outcomes. There are some differences in 
industry conduct regarding transparency and corporate social responsibility based upon 
the source of funding. The main responsibility for attaining development falls to the 
Mongolian government. However, my research indicates that FDI could have a corrosive 
impact on state sovereignty if the state is weak in enforcing rule of law. Surprisingly, I 
find that a strong, active civil society is necessary to maintain the integrity of 
development strategies in the face of significant FDI.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
The year 1990 was a turning point for the Mongolian people. The fall of the 
Soviet Union allowed its longtime satellite state, Mongolia to create its own path towards 
development. Like many postcolonial states, Mongolia adopted a democratic system of 
governance and a capitalist free market economy to advance the country’s economic 
growth and societal progress. Fast-forward 26 years later, I decided to evaluate the 
progress of Mongolia’s development. I wanted to address whether a country of only 3 
million people with vast land and natural resources has successfully implemented policies 
to stimulate economic growth and development. 
In the past, the Mongolian economy depended on agriculture and traditional 
herding. Today, Mongolia is a developing country with abundant mineral resources. The 
recent mining boom in Mongolia has helped the Mongolian Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) grow at a double-digit rate in 2011 and 2012. Some have gone as far calling 
Mongolia “Minegolia” (Langfitt, 2012).  Mongolia’s natural resources are exported to its 
southern neighbor, China, whose rapid industrialization requires significant amount of 
natural resources. The insatiable Chinese demand for natural resources became the 
perfect market for Mongolia’s export sector. The vast amount of mineral riches quickly 
turned the Mongolian extraction industry to become the biggest contributor to the 
country’s GDP. 
In order to develop its extraction industries, the Mongolian government 
increasingly relies on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for infrastructure and technology 
development. Foreign investors have provided a substantial amount of funds to develop 
Mongolia’s extraction industry. Currently, copper and coal are the top export 
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commodities that provide a significant contribution to the Mongolian economy (The 
Observatory of Economic Complexity, n.d.). 
Given Mongolia’s abundant natural resources, Mongolia has the opportunity to 
use extraction industries to jumpstart development. This thesis evaluates Mongolia’s 
development progress by examining the promise and pitfalls of FDI in the extraction 
industry by using post-1990 Mongolia as a case study. This thesis employs comparative 
case study of the mines to investigate whether the extraction industry can lead an 
effective and sustainable development strategy. Additionally, I look at whether the source 
of the FDI makes a difference in development efforts. Finally, I look at the factors of 
state regulation and management of FDI, and the involvement of civil society in creating 
accountability for state sponsored development strategies.  
Thus, the research questions encompasses series of interrelated inquiries including 
1) whether human development can be achieved through extraction industries 2) whether 
the source of FDI has a strong impact on development outcomes, and 3) whether FDI 
influences state-led development efforts and decision making to the extent that it 
threatens the development of Mongolian sovereignty. These series of inquiries will help 
in understanding the relationship between FDI, state led development strategies and 
development outcomes.  
In the end, I conclude that the extraction industry can either help or harm 
Mongolian development; the long-term results of FDI will depend upon the Mongolian 
government’s actions in managing the FDI. In terms of understanding FDI’s role in 
development outcomes, I conclude that the source of FDI does not significantly impact 
the development outcomes. There are some variances in the business conduct of the 
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companies’ transparency and corporate responsibility. However, the development 
outcome depends more on the state’s ability to manage foreign investments. Finally, my 
investigation into whether FDI can influence state decision-making process showed that 
FDI could have an adverse effect on the state sovereignty. The comparative case study 
showed that foreign investors could diminish state sovereignty by challenging rule of law 
in the host country. Such hindrances to the exercise of state sovereignty by the foreign 
investors could result in erosion of the state. However, most importantly, the case study 
showed that it requires a strong civil society to hold the government accountable for 
maintaining the integrity of development strategies in the face of large FDI.  
The following chapter will begin by drawing knowledge from existing bodies of 
literature on development theories, Chinese Foreign Direct Investment patterns, and 
extraction industries. Chapter Three will consist of background information on the 
current state of political and economic development in Mongolia. Chapter Four contains 
the methodology this research utilizes to examine the case studies. Chapter Five contains 
a comparative case study of two prominent mines in Mongolia to demonstrate the 
dynamics of FDI in the extraction industry. Finally, Chapter Six analyzes the results of 
this comparison and concludes this research. 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis draws knowledge from three existing bodies of literature to help assess 
current trends in development in Mongolia. The first section of this literature review 
surveys the evolution of ideas about development to aid in understanding the recent 
trends in Mongolia. I also review recent literature on Chinese foreign direct investment in 
order to provide an understanding of how Chinese influence has expanded over the years 
and how Mongolia is impacted by their economic influence. The final section explains 
the role of extraction industries in the development process. Together, this literature 
provides a background for understanding current development conditions in Mongolia. 
Development Theories 
Economic development discourse became a central issue following World War II. 
It was shaped by the Western Allies’ efforts to provide financial support to exert political 
influence in newly emerging independent states (Staples, 2006). American foreign policy 
sought to ensure that the newly independent states would not fall under the communist 
bloc. Cold War politics encouraged the promotion of capitalism in emerging developing 
countries (Staples, 2006). Although there have been different approaches to development, 
five main theories are most prominent: modernization, structuralism, dependency theory, 
neoclassical theory, and recently, theories concerning sustainable human development. 
Over time, development theories evolved as scholars differed over the best means of 
attaining economic, social and political progress in underdeveloped countries. In the 
more established notions of development, stimulating economic growth was given 
significant emphasis (Staples, 2006).  However, current development discourse is shifting 
towards a stronger consensus that rejects the exclusive focus on economic growth and 
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moves towards sustainable development that also prioritizes human rights, sustainable 
environment, and social, political and economic freedoms (Sachs, 2015; Stiglitz et al., 
2010; Hosseni, 2003; Alkire and Deneulin, 2009). 
In the 1950 to 1960s, modernization theory was the dominant development 
concept. Modernization theory stemmed from the American foreign policy that 
encouraged developing countries to industrialize to foster economic growth and at the 
same time, to discourage Communist affiliation (Engerman et al., 2003). Modernization 
theory urged a complete break from traditional societies to embrace modernity as defined 
by the West. One of the most influential modernization theorists, Walt W. Rostow, 
established the model of linear “stages of growth” which asserted that developing 
countries must go through certain stages of growth to achieve full development. The 
initial stage involved breaking away from traditional society (Rostow, 1960). 
Additionally, modernization theorists believed that all societies could achieve sustainable 
development through implementing liberal capitalist policies (Engerman et al., 2003). 
Modernization also meant mirroring the Western lifestyle by reforming the economic, 
political and social structures of traditional society for “genuine development” including 
industrialization, the adoption of western technology, and education centering on 
capitalist economic development theories (Gilman, 2003). 
In Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) analysis of modernization theory, they argued that 
modernization is “probabilistic, not deterministic.” Unlike the modernization theorist 
who believed in a mechanistic and linear process of development, they argue that 
economic growth does not have a predictable growth pattern because there are too many 
factors that can influence the outcome of development. Finally, they argued that 
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economic growth does change some aspects of culture, but the values of a country do not 
change easily due to fundamental differences in the value systems of rich and poor 
nations (Ingelhart and Baker, 2000). Other critics of modernization theory postulate that 
the linear development model is incorrect. Matunhu (2000) argues that the 
oversimplification of modernization theory is its greatest fault. Not all countries follow 
the same explicit linear path. The structural makeup of a particular developing country is 
significantly different from rich, as well as other developing countries. 
At the end of 1960’s to 1970’s, structuralist theorists gained popularity. 
Structuralist discourse centered on Keynesian economics and advocated for government 
intervention in some economic sectors and recommended institutional and market 
structural reform (Lin, 2012; Fischer, 2015; Cimoli and Porcile, 2010; Storm, 2015). 
Structuralist theorists maintained that the failure of previous development theories was 
due to inapplicable development models imposed by Western dominance. In developing 
countries, capitalist economic policies were not successful in stimulating economic 
growth due to structural makeup of the developing countries. 
Additionally, structuralist scholars argued that underdevelopment of developing 
countries persists due to the technological and industrial structure differences. Developed 
countries have superior industrial market and technology over the developing countries 
(Cimoli and Porcile, 2010). The developed countries use their superior industrial markets 
and technology to suppress the developing countries’ economies. Therefore, the authors 
argue that the best strategy for development is to reduce the technology gap, increase 
international competitiveness and encourage developing countries’ export industry to 
compete in the global market. (Cimoli and Porcile, 2001). 
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In the recent structuralist discourse, authors Lin (2012) and Ghose (2010) argue 
that the inequality between developed and developing countries is due to a substantial 
income and technology gap. The authors agree that structural adjustment is necessary for 
eliminating the gap between the rich and poor countries. Previous theory on 
modernization advocated for a complete break from the traditional society, however, 
Ghose (2010) argues that traditional industry can coexist with modern industries. The 
simultaneous development of both traditional and modern industries can help close 
income inequality. 
Following the 1970s, international dependency theory emerged to explain 
development. Dependency theory argues that in the capitalist world, there is an uneven 
division of labor between developed and developing countries (Todaro and Smith, 2009). 
The World Systems Theory developed by Immanuel Wallerstein argues that the world is 
divided into core, semi-periphery, and periphery based upon an international division of 
labor (Wallerstein, 2004). Core (developed) countries have a strong central government 
with capital-intensive industries and a highly skilled workforce. Peripheries are the 
developing countries that lack strong government, labor-intensive industries and a low-
skilled workforce. Semi-peripheries are developing countries that are industrializing 
countries that fall between the core and the periphery. They all operate in a capitalist 
world economy where the core controls international markets and develop unequal trade 
relations benefitting the core, but not the rest of the world (Wallerstein, 2004).  Todaro 
and Smith add that the core’s exploitive activities in the (periphery) countries perpetuate 
underdevelopment of the developing countries. In other words, the authors contend that 
underdevelopment was an externally induced phenomenon by the developed countries as 
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a result of the power imbalance. (Todaro and Smith, 2009). Vernengo (2006) adds that 
the core conducts its power through the means of financial dependency.  Developing 
countries require a substantial amount of financial loans to develop technology, 
infrastructure, and industrial sectors. 
At the end of the 1970s, neoliberalism became the central development discourse.  
The framework for neoliberal theory relied on adopting the Westernization tenets from 
modernization theory; however, neoliberal theorists relied on market forces rather than 
state actions. The theorists argued that too much state intervention, inefficiency in 
resource allocation, and lack of economic incentives to stimulate economic growth causes 
underdevelopment (Lin, 2012; Todaro and Smith, 2009). Lin (2012) writes that the 
neoliberal school of thought firmly believed that free markets, privatization, free trade 
and deregulation of government would stimulate economic growth, and the growth would 
eventually “trickle down” to alleviate poverty (Lin, 2012). 
Critics of neoliberal policies argue that such policies are often unsuccessful in 
developing countries because of the fundamental nature of the institutional, economic and 
the social structure of the developing countries (Todaro and Smith, 2009). Many of the 
developing countries in Latin America failed to develop through neoliberal policies due 
to the political structure of central government and economies heavily controlled by the 
government. Similarly, Lin (2012) argued that in the 20th century, countries like China 
and India achieved remarkable economic growth without following the basic guidelines 
of neoliberal policies. While the neoliberal theorists claim that the invisible hand of the 
free market promotes the general welfare of the people, critics like Todaro and Smith 
(2009) contend that on the contrary, the free market strategy helps those who are already 
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well off (Todaro and Smiht, 2009). Similarly, John Rapley (2007) argued that although 
neoliberal policies resulted in some positive gains in some of the more advanced 
developing countries, in poorer countries, it was less effective, and in some places did 
more harm than good. The neoliberal policies that opened up their market to cheap 
international goods hurt local businesses and had an adverse effect on economic growth. 
Additionally, Ruccio (2011) argued that economic policies imposed by Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAP) did not solve development problems but intensified income 
inequality, social injustice, and environmental degradation. 
In general, most development theories have a great emphasis on economic growth 
as the answer to underdevelopment. However, starting in the 1980s, various development 
theories questioned the previous development theories that were developed by the 
Western countries. The post-development school of thought questioned theories such as 
industrialization, modernization, and neo-liberalization and has expressed discontent with 
the status quo (Schneider, 2010). Post-development theorists emphasize alternatives to 
development that involve more local participation (Ziai, 2009). 
Much like post-development theory, sustainable development theories appeal for 
the reduction of capitalist production and consumption to focus on policies that benefit 
the well-being of humans, as well as the sustainability of the environment. Schneider et 
al. (2010) argue that sustainable development rejects principles that give prominence to 
economic growth as the primary objective and argue that “sustainable degrowth” exposes 
“growth fetishism” as the main problem of underdevelopment. Ross (2009) and Perkins 
(2013) advocate for sustainable environment policies to curb consumption of energy, 
environmental degradation, and air pollution. Additionally, Sachs (2015) contributes to 
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sustainable development theories by advocating for good “economic prosperity, social 
inclusion and cohesion, environmental sustainability, and good governance by major 
social actors, including governments and business” (Sachs, 2015, pg.4). The author 
accords responsibility to individual states and also to the international actors, such as 
multinational corporations, that have the power to change policies. 
Amartya Sen (1999) argues that development is distinct from economic growth. 
His broader concept of development encompasses economic growth, but also prioritizes 
improving the conditions of individuals by addressing poverty, unemployment, social and 
economic inequality, and various forms of discrimination (Sen, 1999; Hosseni, 2003). 
Additionally, Aknuluy et al. (2015) argued for alternative forms of development by 
advocating the necessity of addressing the environmental cost of prioritizing economic 
growth. 
Similarly, prominent scholars like Stiglitz, Sen, Fitoussi (2010) and Hosseini 
(2003) questioned the validity of using of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as the proper 
means to measure growth and progress. Stiglitz et al. (2010) contended that there are too 
many nuances to societal progress that an exclusive focus on GDP fails to include. The 
authors explained that the multifaceted nature of societal wellbeing needs not only 
aggregate data on income, but also its distribution (Stiglitz, et al., 2010). 
Critics of these models of development like Sampath question the feasibility of 
constructing a new vision for development with an emphasis on societal wellbeing. 
Sampath (2014) states that it is not feasible for scholars to produce a development 
discourse based on assessing societal wellbeing due to its multidimensional nature. 
However, scholars Alkire and Deneulin (2009) posit that evaluating people’s freedoms 
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could assess societal well-being. According to Alkire and Deneulin, enriching people’s 
freedom of self-determination to a healthy life, education, employment and political and 
social participation is the foundation of development (Alkire and Deneulin, 2009).  The 
principle argument is to reimagine growth, not in economic terms, but as social and 
political improvement. Societal growth includes economic sustainability, environmental 
protection, addressing income inequality, poverty measurement, and advocating for 
quality of life for all (Stiglitz et al., 2010; Hosseni, 2003; Alkire and Deneulin, 2009). 
Additionally, some have attempted to incorporate human rights into development 
discourse. Marks (2010) argues that human rights and development studies share a 
common goal towards progress in societal well-being. 
Marks (2010) states the following: … human rights and development share a 
common finality and a concern with the potential of empowerment, suggesting a 
more hopeful role for human rights in development, as a vehicle for 
empowerment and social transformation in which human rights are development 
objectives. (p.2) 
 
The evolution of development theories post WWII suggests that economic growth 
is no longer the singular focus of development. History has shown that capitalist policies 
were not successful in stimulating economic growth, but rather perpetuated 
underdevelopment. In recent years, development has surpassed the significance of 
economic growth to embrace societal well-being, people’s freedoms and protection of 
human rights. 
The following section surveys literature on Chinese foreign direct investment. 
Since the early 2000s, China has been rapidly industrializing and expanding its 
international power. One of its strategies for expansion is outward foreign direct 
investment. China has become an alternative to the existing Western financial institutions 
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for international aid, loans, and investment. The following section will help assess 
Chinese investment practices overseas, and help contextualize its practices in Mongolia. 
Chinese Foreign Direct Investment 
Some scholars have argued that the source of FDI matter in foreign investment 
practices. The following bodies of literature focuses on Chinese foreign direct investment 
due to the strong political and economic ties between China and Mongolia. Since China 
is the biggest trading partner of Mongolia, the Mongolian economy is highly dependent 
on the Chinese demand for Mongolia’s export commodity. Therefore, it is important to 
take a look at Chinese FDI specifically.  
China’s outward direct investment (ODI) has grown substantially over the last 
decade. According to the 2016 World Investment Report from the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), China is the third largest outward 
investor in the world, following the United States and Japan respectively (UNCTAD, 
2016). The scale and the extent of Chinese investment grew exponentially since the 
introduction of the “Going-Out” economic policy of 2001. The chart in Figure 1 shows 
the growth of Chinese outward investment. The Chinese government actively encouraged 
foreign investment in the developing countries through loans, bilateral and multilateral 
trade and various forms of debt cancellation. The Chinese ODI has been rapidly growing 
in three distinct sectors: service, manufacturing, and mining. These Chinese industries 
invest all over the world in areas ranging from developed countries like United States, 
Canada and Australia to developing poor nations like Sudan, Nigeria, and Myanmar. 
Although China’s investment contributes significantly to the developing countries, there 
have been common concerns over its investment motivations and implications. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
Source: Congressional Research Service 
According to Jiang (2009), Chinese strategy for ODI is an externalization of its 
development paradigm. The author contends there is a linkage between Chinese domestic 
development policies and its actions overseas. Chinese extraction strategy is driven by its 
need to secure natural resources and its aggressive measures to secure them is evident in 
its domestic and international practices. These aggressive measures can result in 
detrimental social consequences in the host countries, such as unsafe work conditions that 
can lead to industrial accidents, environmental disasters from extraction industries, and 
economic inequality (Jiang, 2009). 
Kolstad and Wiig’s (2012) research reveals that there is a distinct political pattern 
to the investment decisions of Chinese ODI. First, Chinese companies are attracted to 
large markets of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries. Chinese manufacturing services target large markets to export cheap 
commodities. 
Second, Chinese foreign direct investment in natural resources target countries 
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second pattern is valid to non-OECD countries (Kolstad & Wiig, 2012). Additional 
research by the authors finds that Chinese oil extraction industries in Africa are likely to 
prop up repressive regimes, benefiting a few elites while the majority of Africans see 
little to no benefit to their investment (Kolstad & Wiig, 2011). For example, the authors 
assert that China invests in the Sudanese oil industry even though other Western investors 
condemned Sudanese human rights violations and terminated their trade deals (Wiig and 
Kolstad, 2011). China used the investment vacuum as an opportunity to import Sudanese 
oil, while exporting manufactured good and weapons to Sudan (Wiig and Kolstad, 2011). 
Tan (2012) posits that another motivation for China’s overseas investment is to 
diversify Chinese markets and strengthen Chinese financial positions in the international 
arena.  The author adds that the Chinese global expansion is to create an alternative 
financial framework to the one developed by Western countries. China’s strategy to 
increase its competitiveness in the international market involves various financial 
assistance to African countries in the form of debt relief, loans with longer terms than the 
Western financial organizations, and loans with little to no political restrictions (Peh and 
Eyal, 2010).  Similarly, Mol (2011) adds that Chinese banks gain an advantage by 
providing lower ethical and environmental standards than an international organization 
such as WB, IMF and EU Investment Bank. Consequently, Western financial institutions 
claim that China’s “no strings attached policies” undermine international standards and 
promote widespread corruption (Peh and Eyal, 2010). 
The employment practices of Chinese investment overseas are questionable. Peh 
and Eyal (2010) explain that many Chinese migrant workers are often assigned 
managerial jobs, while hired African workers work in negligent and unsafe work 
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environments. In addition to the improper work environment, some Chinese companies 
force workers to work overtime and disregard local labor laws (Anshan, 2007). In 2011, 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported labor abuses in the Chinese Copper Mines in 
Zambia. In the report, HRW claimed that Chinese companies provided insufficient 
protection for workers’ safety and wellbeing. Many of the workers risked their health by 
working without a proper gear (HRW, 2011).  Anshan (2007) adds many workers were 
threatened with termination if the employees voiced complaints or refused to work. 
Additionally, Anshan (2007) argues that local employment suffers due to Chinese 
company managers’ preference for hiring Chinese nationals. Often, the local 
communities do not believe that the Chinese companies contribute sufficiently to the 
local economy when locals do not have employment opportunities (Adisu et al., 2010). 
Jiang (2009) explains that the Chinese exploitative domestic policies on low 
wageworkers are reflected in their overseas employment practices. 
Chinese presence has also had an adverse impact on the economic conditions of 
the host countries. Adisu et al., (2010) argue that the expansion of trade relations between 
China and the African nations have benefited China more than the African countries. Peh 
and Eyal (2010) reason that Chinese trade could lead to a low-cost manufacturing base in 
a host country that could hurt existing industries. For example, hypothetically, a Chinese 
textile factory in Vietnam can hurt existing Vietnamese textile business by providing 
cheaper, low-cost manufactured goods. Additionally, cheap Chinese commodities can 
enter the host countries’ market and compete with the domestic businesses. Adisu et al. 
(2010) revealed that the African markets became flooded with cheap Chinese products 
causing competition between domestic markets and Chinese manufacturers. Local 
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industries cannot compete with the low prices of Chinese commodities and ultimately 
lose business to the Chinese manufacturers (Adisu et al., 20.10). 
One of the most criticized aspects of Chinese investment practices overseas is 
their lack of environmental consideration. Jiang (2009) argues that Chinese domestic 
environmental policies (or the lack there of) translate to its lackluster international 
environmental policies. The author argues that since the structure of domestic Chinese 
environmental policies entails lax regulations and the absence of strong enforcement, 
Chinese companies are unlikely to promote effective environmental consideration in their 
business practices abroad (Jang, 2009). Accordingly, Chinese enterprises exploit African 
countries that do not possess strict environmental regulations. 
In 2014, the Chinese government introduced “Guidelines for Social 
Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investments” to address human rights, labor issues, 
and environmental issues. However, the guidelines are recommendations and are not 
enforceable (Moi, 2011). Tang-Lee (2015) adds that the policies are more of a placation 
than a resolution. Chinese companies provide short-term concessions while neglecting 
major community grievances. Consequently, the scholars recommend a serious change in 
the regulation practices of Chinese enterprises and stricter policy regulations in the host 
countries (Tang-Lee, 2015). 
The literature on Chinese foreign investment practices in natural resources reveals 
interesting results. First, Chinese investment is motivated by the need to secure natural 
resources for its rapid industrialization. Often, this motivation leads to aggressive 
measures to attain natural resources. Second, China is not only enhancing its domestic 
power, but it is also expanding its international power. Until recently, China was an 
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investor seeker, but recently, it has positioned itself to become an investment provider. 
The China has become a global player through its successful “going out” policy. 
The following section presents literature on the extraction industries. The 
scholarly work analyzes the effect of extraction-led development. The knowledge drawn 
from this investment discourse can help explain how Mongolia can attain development by 
prioritizing extraction industries, and the risks associated with resource-led development. 
Extraction Industries 
Many capital-scarce developing countries attempt economic growth through 
extraction industries with very limited success. The economic underperformance of 
resource-rich countries has garnered much attention and research. Many have debated the 
failure of economic growth in resource-rich countries. Most studies suggest that there is 
evidence of a “resource curse” where countries with abundant natural resources tend to 
experience slower economic growth (Bhattacharyya and Collier, 2011).  Others argue 
resources themselves are not a curse; they can bring opportunities for economic growth, 
but the weak political and regulatory structure can lead to a slow economic development 
(Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, 2006). Countries with weak institutions are hurt by 
resource abundance because weak institutions are susceptible to corruption and the 
revenue from the resources can enrich elite few. Therefore, the resource boom becomes a 
“resource curse.” However, in institutionally strong countries, resource revenue is 
invested into the domestic economy and can become a “blessing.” 
Some scholars argue that natural resource revenues can contribute to national 
economic growth if the government of the resource-rich country takes advantage of it. 
Bhattacharyya and Collier (2011) argue that conceptually, it is simple to image economic 
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growth through a resource boom. The government can tax resource rent for potential 
investors, and use the revenues to invest domestically, which can encourage economic 
growth. However, this scenario has not usually panned out. Natural resource-led 
development alters the structure of the economy. Venables (2016) explains that this 
phenomenon is considered a “Dutch Disease” where extraction industries’ displace other 
tradable industries, causing a decline in the country’s competitiveness in the international 
market. Similarly, Sachs and Warner (2001) also argued that resource abundant countries 
tend to focus on extraction industries and are likely to neglect developing other export 
industries. Fast revenues from mining encourage more profit allocations to develop the 
mining sector further while other tradable sectors like agriculture become defunded and 
neglected. Extraction-led development creates a new economic structure highly 
dependent on the revenues of one sector (Venables, 2016; Sachs and Warner, 2001). 
The problem of dependency is that resource revenues can be highly volatile. Pegg 
(2006) reasons that when countries become dependent on an extractive industry, they also 
become more vulnerable to economic shock. Resource revenues depend on the stability 
of the international market prices of the product. A price of a commodity can be highly 
unstable and unpredictable. If the market price of a product falls, so does the resource 
revenue.  Therefore, the government is dependent upon highly risky income to meet its 
budget (Pegg, 2006). Additionally, Venables (2016) contend that weak governments have 
a difficult time with fiscal discipline. The increase in revenues allows the government to 
postpone crucial economic policies and push policies to that advance extraction industry 
(Venables, 2016). 
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There is a significant amount of research that argues that the institutional makeup 
of a country determines if a resource boom is a blessing or a curse. The failures of 
African resource rich countries are well known. However, countries like the United 
States, Australia, and Canada were once resource wealthy countries and were able to 
achieve substantial economic growth. Pegg (2006) argues that countries like the United 
States, Canada, and Australia differ from the African countries because of stable legal 
and financial institutions existed in those countries before their extractive industries 
developed. 
Venables (2016) argue that resource politics can play out in democratic as well as 
autocratic countries. However, adverse resource politics are more apparent in 
authoritarian states. Ross (2001) explains that authoritarian governments are more likely 
favor the needs of the wealthy than the poor. In such countries, the poor do not have the 
power to voice their concerns to influence government policies (Ross, 2001). Resource-
dependent countries spend revenues bolstering their security to help suppress protestors 
and activist against the government. Venables (2016) also argue that resource revenues 
can encourage autocratic leaders to consolidate power and often, increase the risk of 
conflict. Pegg (2006) cites a World Bank study that revealed countries with greater 
dependency on resource revenue are significantly more at risk of conflict. Furthermore, a 
primary cause of the conflict was related to the allocation of resource revenues. Ferguson  
(2006) takes the argument further and explains that many extractive industries in Africa 
use private militaries to ensure control over the extraction industries. Ferguson (2006) 
recalls the security-led approach of the Angolan model, featuring private corporations 
that exploit natural resource rich territories and then employ private militaries to ensure 
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security while corrupt government officials provide legal rights to the corporation as a 
bribe. Sachs and Warner (2001) similarly argue that the in such conditions, the country is 
no longer in a developmental state, but a predatory one. 
According to scholars, resource dependence has a negative effect on poverty. 
Ross (2015) concluded that in the analyses of resource dependence and Human 
Development Index (HDI), there was a strong correlation on mineral dependence with a 
lower standard of living and a high rate of poverty.  The author argues that in corrupt, 
resource-rich countries, revenues from the resources are unlikely to be invested in public 
programs such as health, education, and poverty alleviation (Ross, 2015). The revenues 
from resource extraction stay in the pockets of few elites, while a majority of the public 
do not benefit from the resource profits. 
One of the social benefits of economic development through extractive industries 
is the promise of infrastructure development. However, Pegg (2006) argues investors 
often develop infrastructure in strategic methods where infrastructure primarily benefits 
corporate use.  For example, newly built roads and transportation systems are targeted 
towards helping the investors rather than the locals (Pegg, 2006). 
Additionally, some scholars argue that extractive industries can create jobs in the 
mining sector and income from employment will generate economic growth. While it is 
certainly true that a resource boom creates employment, Pegg (2006) argues that 
extractive industries are not labor intensive but capital intensive. Thus, the creation of 
jobs is rather small in comparison to other industries such as agriculture. Furthermore, 
extractive industries can have an adverse impact on the unemployment rate. Since the 
non-mining sectors lose competitiveness in the international market, industries close 
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down causing an increase in the level of unemployment.  Additionally, some corporations 
bring foreign workers to work in the mines and do not contribute to the local economy. 
The literature on extraction industries provided insightful knowledge. Developing 
economies need a sustainable economic growth to decrease poverty and to advance 
public capital. However, resource-led development is not sustainable since it depletes the 
natural resources. Also, as mentioned above, overdependence on one industry is highly 
precarious. Additionally, countries with a limited ability to control all parts of 
government administration are at risk of an increase in corruption. 
The existing scholarly work on development, Chinese foreign direct investment, 
and extraction industries provided great insight into how resource-rich countries develop. 
The knowledge drawn from the review will contextualize Mongolia’s current 
development.  
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CHAPTER III: HISTORY OF MONGOLIA SINCE 1990 
Background information 
In 1990, Mongolia peacefully transitioned from seven decades of socialism to 
democracy.  The transition was internationally praised for the absence of violence and 
commended for its swift transition after the fall of Soviet Union. The democratic 
transition entailed significant political and economic reform. Politically, Mongolia 
decentralized from a one party system to a multiparty parliamentary system. The Prime 
Minister who is appointed by the President heads the government. Parliamentary 
elections are based on a parallel voting system. Economically, Mongolia adopted a free 
market economy where government plays a smaller role, and private companies 
spearhead economic growth. The government quickly privatized state enterprises and 
reformed tax policies to transition to the market economy. 
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Mongolia needed substantial aid to repair 
the country’s economic, social and political structure.  As a Soviet satellite state, the 
Mongolian economy relied on the Soviet subsidies that totaled one-third of Mongolia's 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Wagner, 2012). After the evaporation of Soviet financial 
support, Mongolia fell into a deep recession with high unemployment rate, and 
widespread poverty. The newly formed democratic government turned to international 
financial institutions like the World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for financial assistance. International aid came with a 
conditional structural adjustment program that imposed implementation of neoliberal 
policies like rapid privatization, a free market economy and the deregulation by the 
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Mongolian government. The international lending institutions believed that the only path 
for development was through an implementation of these neoliberal economic policies. 
Until recently, the Mongolian economy was largely dependent on traditional 
industries such as agriculture and herding. However, in the early 2000s, the Mongolian 
mining industry experienced a dramatic boom after it discovered vast untapped reserves 
of natural resources including gold, copper, high-quality coking coal, uranium, tin, and 
iron. In 2009, the government saw the opportunity to develop its mining industry and 
invited foreign governments to invest in the untapped natural resources. The benefits of 
foreign direct investment showed in the double-digit growth of the economy in 2011 and 
2012 (“Mongolia”).  The mining industry quickly became the primary contributor to the 
GDP. According to United Nations Development Programme, Mongolian mining sector 
is responsible for estimated 40% of government revenues as well as 80% of exports from 
the country (“About Mongolia”).  Although the profit from the mining industry has 
encouraged economic growth, as I explored in my literature review, excessive 
dependence on a single sector can be a problem to the economy. The overreliance on one 
sector can expose the Mongolian economy to the unpredictable nature of commodity 
price fluctuations. 
As a landlocked country with limited transportation infrastructure, Mongolia faces 
many challenges in developing efficient export industries. Located between the two of 
the biggest markets, Russia and China, Mongolia’s export market is mainly limited to 
these two countries. The implications of limited trading partners can have negative 
consequence as economic and political change in either country can have a significant 
effect on the Mongolian economy. For example, Figure 2 indicates GDP of Mongolia 
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from 2013 to 2015. The economic slowdown in 2014 to 2015 is largely due to the 
decrease in Chinese demand for Mongolian minerals. 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Trading Economics 
The relationship between China and Mongolia is complex. Over 200 years of 
subjugation under Chinese rule has lead to mistrust of Chinese presence in the country.  
However, the Mongolian economy is heavily dependent on China’s import of Mongolian 
natural resources. The rapid industrialization of China created a unique opportunity for 
Mongolia’s top export minerals such as copper ore and coal to China. Since 2004, 
Mongolia has consistently exported over 95% of all production of both minerals to China. 
According to 2014 data, China has purchased 99.5% of Mongolian copper ore and 99.8% 
of its coal production. Collectively, Mongolia exported over $3 billion (over half of its 
exports) worth of minerals to China in 2014. Consequently, the Mongolian economy is 
heavily dependent on the Chinese demand for copper and coal (“Mongolian Export”). 
The danger of depending on one market for economic growth was realized in the 
years 2014 and 2015 when Chinese demand for Mongolian natural resources decreased. 
-1.26%
6.37%
17.5%
12.5% 11.6%
8.1%
2.4%
-5
0
5
10
15
20
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Mongolian GDP Growth Rate (2009-2015)
 25 
The decline in demand caused the Mongolian GDP growth rate to plummet from 17% in 
2011 to 2.3% in 2015 (Bernard, 2016). The GDP growth rate continued to slow down, as 
economists forecast the likelihood of a continual decrease due to diminishing Chinese 
demand. On September 3, 2016, President Xi Jinping signed the Paris climate agreement 
deal that promises to decrease emissions production in China by 2030. The commitment 
did not include specific targets for China, however, the President pledged to curb their 
emissions production by restricting the burning of fossil fuels. The Chinese commitment 
is alarming to the Mongolian economy as China is their number one natural resource 
export partner. Mongolian coal production depends on the Chinese demand for coal. If 
China ceases to import Mongolian coal, the Mongolian economy will shrink 
significantly. In order to avoid a further economic slump, the Mongolian government 
needs to reform its export industries where it can avoid overreliance on one industry by 
developing other export sectors such as agriculture and herding. 
The Mongolian political environment has not been without a fair share of 
controversy. Party fraction, corruption, nepotism and political instability have plagued 
the country. Mongolian politics often experience turbulent parliamentary politics in the 
State Ih Khural (the state assembly). The dominant parties are the Mongolian People’s 
Party (MPP) (current ruling party), the Democratic Party (DP), and the Mongolian 
People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP). The Mongolian electoral process is highly 
contentious, and rules change frequently. At the beginning of the 2000s, the Mongolian 
political environment started disintegrating due to internal disagreements. The Grand 
Coalition formed in 2004 collapsed due to contention over party leadership. The collapse 
of the coalition left the parliament without a clear majority, leaving it unable to function. 
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In response, 25 members of the DP switched party to join the MPRP, declaring it the 
ruling party. Some citizens, as well as other parliamentary members, denounced the 
controversial move.  However, it did help overcome a government impasse.  The 
compromise did not last long, as the parliament again went through major political 
upheaval in 2008. 
The political dysfunction continued in 2008 as a controversial parliamentary 
election took place. Scandals involving voter fraud questioned the election result that 
declared MPRP as the ruling party. On July 1, 2008, peaceful protestors gathered to 
oppose the election results in the streets of Sukhbaatar square. The peaceful rally quickly 
turned into a violent riot as a group of people threw rocks and set fires to the MPRP 
headquarters and the Cultural Museum Building beside it. In the end, five people died, 
and hundreds were injured. The government called its first-ever state of emergency that 
lasted four days (“Mongolia calls state of emergency,” 2008). 
Another political controversy followed the next election in 2012, over the arrest 
of the former president Enkhbayar Nambar (MPRP) on allegations of corruption and 
nepotism. The international community widely condemned the April 13th, 2012, arrest 
procedure and the accusation of the former president for violating fundamental human 
rights (“Amnesty International Public Statement”). Amnesty International criticized the 
lack of due process and the treatment of Mr. Nambar following his arrest. The supporters 
of Mr. Nambar claimed that the motivation to charge him was to exclude him from the 
upcoming parliamentary election (Levin, 2012). The Ulaanbaatar district court convicted 
Mr. Nambar of corruption, embezzlement, and misappropriation of government 
properties. The initial court sentence was seven years in prison, and a monetary fine but 
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Mr. Nambar spent less than a month in prison and was transferred to a private hospital to 
finish off his sentence. However, on August 1, 2013, President Elbegdorj Tsakhia 
pardoned Mr.Nambar and released him from his convictions (Erkhes, 2013). 
Throughout the political upheaval, the Mongolian civil society played a 
significant role in voicing discontent over government incompetence in dealing with a 
stagnant economy, unemployment, inequality and most of all, corruption. According to 
2015 Transparency International corruption index, Mongolia scored 39 out of 100, 
indicating rampant corruption in the public and private sector (Transparency 
International).  A survey conducted by the Asia Foundation in June 2015 found that 59% 
of the respondents believed that corruption has increased from previous years and think it 
will continue to grow in the coming years (Nara, 2015).  In 2006, the Independent 
Authority Against Corruption (IAAC) was established to fight against corruption and 
bribery. Under the attorney general, the IAAC has the power to investigate public 
officials and private businesses and refer appropriate cases to the General Prosecutor’s 
office (“IAAC”).    
Although the IAAC has made significant strides in combatting the ubiquitous 
corruption, international communities like Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia (ACN) believe stronger measures can be taken to prevent and fight 
corruption. Critics believe that the current criminal law of Mongolia does not meet the 
standard of the international criminalization of corrupt practices and appropriate 
enforcement is lacking in serious corruption cases. Additionally, political party financing 
is often unregulated. Nepotism and bribery also plague the Judiciary organ (“Anti-
Corruption Reforms in Mongolia,” 2015). 
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According to Transparency International’s most recent data, in 2013, 65% of 
Mongolians that were surveyed felt political parties were corrupt. Similarly, 73% of the 
interviewees felt that judiciary was "extremely" corrupt (Transparency International). 
Civil society organizations agree that to achieve true economic and social equality, a 
culture of transparency and accountability must be created at all levels of government, 
and in the judicial and executive sectors. 
In the last two decades, Mongolian society has experienced major social 
transformation. As a Soviet satellite, Mongolian people’s social standing was relatively 
equal. Although the country was experiencing a significant shortage of food and relied on 
the Soviet Union for most of the county’s nutritional needs, Mongolians had universal 
health care and education. Additionally, the centrally planned economy provided jobs to 
the people and kept the unemployment rate low. Following democratization in 1990, 
citizens had high hope of an increase in the living standards. However, achieving 
development through a free market economy proved to be a challenge. According to July 
2016 data, the Mongolian unemployment rate is at 10.4%, indicating a higher rate than 
the previous three years.  
Additionally, the 2016 survey from Mongolian NGO Sant Maral Foundation 
reported that citizens’ primary concern was unemployment (36% of responders) and 
number two was standards of living/poverty/income with 15.1% (Sant Maral Foundation, 
2015). Regional disparity is also apparent. Urban dwellers have better access to social 
programs than the pastoral herders who live far from cities and have limited access to 
resources. Also, 55.9% of the respondents answered that the government fails to solve the 
most urgent problem “always” and 28.1% responded the government failed to solve them 
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“often.”  A staggering 84% of the respondents felt that the government is incompetent in 
addressing the country’s most pressing social issues. 
In Mongolia, access to quality health and education is unequal. The Mongolian 
literacy rate is 98% for both men and women. Compulsory primary education has been 
beneficial for literacy rate of the country. However, secondary education has an unequal 
attendance. Despite high literacy rate, there are disparities in access to quality education. 
According to Mongolia’s 2016 Human Development report, access to education among 
disabled youth is significantly lower. The study reveal that estimated only 66.2% of 
youth with disabilities are enrolled in compulsory education (Mongolia Human 
Development Report, 2016). Urban residents are more likely to continue education and 
attend secondary education than the rural residents. The increasingly high cost of living 
and housing deters rural residents from attending school (Mongolia Human Development 
Report, 2016). Following democratization, private education became highly sought out in 
Mongolia. Parents are encouraged to send their children to private school with better 
education curricula. However, urban residents are more likely to be able to afford better 
education than the poor rural residents. 
Similarly, in the health sector, most of the population depends on national health 
care. As a Soviet satellite, Mongolia benefited from modern medicine for disease control 
and prevention. The decentralization of the government has lead to private and public 
partnership health care reform. The World Health Organization’s 2013 analysis indicated 
that instability in the government set back the improvement of the health care system. 
Changes in ruling parties often make the process of meaningful health care reform slow 
and ineffective. Additionally, the quality of health care can vary in urban to rural areas. 
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Urban residents have better options for health care, as hospitals are easily accessible in 
the capital city. Rural residents have either one hospital in the nearest town, or a limited 
number of doctors that visit from town to town. Also, a person’s income level can 
determine whether they can afford to go to private hospitals for better and faster care. 
According to most recent data, in 2014, the Mongolian poverty rate was 21.6% 
(UNDPMN). However, a sharp increase in the poverty rate is expected as GDP growth 
rate decreased to a single digit in 2015 and continued to drop in early 2016. Additionally, 
in the most recent data on income inequality, by 2012, the richest 20% of the population 
held 41.66% of the national income, while the bottom 20% held 7.6% of the national 
income. The inequality gap continues to widen as the economy continues to slow down. 
The capital city, Ulaanbaatar, is home to an estimated 1.38 million people out of 
the total Mongolian population of 3.02 million people. A significant number of 
individuals have moved from the rural areas to live in the capital city in search of jobs 
and better life opportunity. As of 2015, 72.5 % of the population is living in the capital 
city (the World Bank). Traditional herders are unable to sustain rural life as extreme 
weather conditions in the winter and desertification threatens the sustainability of their 
traditional lifestyle. During harsh winters, thousands to a million livestock can perish due 
to extreme cold or starvation. The herders are also facing desertification as lands become 
increasingly arid due to climate change and human-made factors (BBC, 2016). 
Unfortunately, government-housing organizations are not able to provide 
adequate shelter to the flood of the newcomers, forcing them to create ger (yurt) slums 
surrounding the metropolis. Within few miles of the developing capital lie the slum 
dwellers that live without proper access to health, sanitation, education and employment 
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opportunity. The conditions in the ger slums can get extremely dire during the winters 
where the temperature could fall as low as -40 Celsius.  Due to the extreme cold, 
residents are forced to burn coal for warmth and cooking which significantly intensifies 
the existing air pollution. Pollution levels can go up to a hazardous level where it is 6-7 
times higher than the World Health Organization (WHO) standards (WB, 2012). 
Consequently, the population is vulnerable to many respiratory illnesses, lung cancer and 
in some extreme cases, spontaneous abortion. 
Mongolia is at a crossroads. Economically, the country is suffering from a 
recession due to a slowing of economic growth. Socially, the persistence of high 
unemployment rate continues to concern the citizens. Politically, the instability in the 
parliament decreases the functionality of the government. The notable exception is that 
civil society continues to practice its democratic rights and demonstrate its dissatisfaction 
through electoral participation and public demonstrations. Mongolian voter turnout in a 
parliamentary and presidential election is estimated at 70%. Additionally, many NGOs 
continue to fight for social wellbeing. In a historic 2016 parliamentary election, 85% of 
the vote went to the opposition party MPP that took 65 of the 76 seats in the parliament. 
The citizens openly voiced their discontent with the ruling DP on how it mismanaged 
economic policies and their lack of competence in addressing social problems. The new 
ruling party has the unique opportunity to establish stability in the government and to 
promote foreign investment that encourages multiple export sectors without over-relying 
on mining industries. Additionally, fiscal discipline is required to curb national spending 
and allocate resources for societal wellbeing. Much faith is placed on the new 
government to address the most urgent problems of society. 
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The background information provided a broad overview of the Mongolian 
society. Since 1990, Mongolia has achieved great success in poverty reduction and 
democratic representation of the people. However, there are still problems concerning 
even development. The following section contains the case study to answer the research 
questions. The case study will provide an answer to whether extraction-led development 
can lead to development. 
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CHAPTER IV. Methodology 
This thesis engages in a comparative case study to investigate the promise and 
pitfalls of FDI in creating development, using Mongolia as a case study. The research 
questions encompasses series of interrelated inquiries including 1) whether human 
development can be achieved through extraction industries 2) whether the source of FDI 
has a strong impact on development outcomes, and 3) whether FDI influences state-led 
development efforts and decision making to the extent that it threatens the development 
of Mongolian sovereignty 
The principle research methodologies utilize qualitative and quantitative analysis 
of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include contract agreements, 
Mongolian mining laws and legislation, government and independent investigator 
reports, official public complaints, data collected from the World Bank, the government 
of Mongolia, and independent arbiter decisions. Secondary sources include news reports 
and academic journals addressing Mongolian foreign investment, extraction industry, 
social and environmental concerns, corruption, political instability and economic 
development. 
In order to assess whether foreign investment in the extraction industries has 
contributed to the development of Mongolia and to evaluate whether differences in 
foreign investor affect the impact of the investment, my comparative case study analyzes 
two prominent mines. In order to measure the impacts of the investments, the two mines 
are analyzed by their contribution to Mongolia’s (1) political environment, (2) economic 
growth, (3) societal progress and (4) environmental sustainability. Also, to address the 
second research question, the foreign investors are evaluated based on their business 
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conduct. The foreign investors will be examined by their regulatory compliance and 
corporate social responsibility. 
The first section will identify the two foreign invested mining operations in my 
case study. The second section will analyze the impact of both mines on Mongolian 
development, and their relationship to the Mongolian government’s enforcement efforts. 
The final section will include concluding analysis and address the research questions. 
The two mines were selected based on their significant contribution to the 
Mongolian GDP. As discussed in the background information, Mongolia’s export sector 
relies heavily on the international demand for its two major natural resources: copper and 
coal. The Oyu Tolgoi (hereafter OT) is Mongolia’s biggest mine extracting copper, gold, 
and ore. However, copper is the principal natural resource for extraction. So far, mining 
giant Rio Tinto and Ivanhoe Mines together invested $6.6 billion to develop OT’s open 
pit (Els, 2014). In May 2016, the Mongolian government and the investors signed off on 
a $5.3 billion investment to further development of OT’s underground pit. With the 
development of the underground pit, revenues are expected to significantly increase 
revenues for both parties ("Rio Tinto approves the development of Oyu Tolgoi 
underground mine," 2016). 
The Khushuut mine is the second largest coal deposit in Mongolia.1 The Khusuut 
mine is under 100% ownership of the Chinese mineral and energy exploration company, 
Mongolia Energy Corporation (MEC). The Khushuut’s production supplies Xinjiang’s 
rapid industrialization that demands quality-coking coal for steel production (Daily 
                                                        
1 The largest coalmine, Tavan Tolgoi is eliminated due to its beginning exploration stage 
as of 2016. There are not enough data available to evaluate the mine’s operation. 
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China, 2008). The Khushuut mine is expected to produce 3 to 8 million tons of coking 
coal each year for the Xinjiang coal market. 
Additionally, the two mines extract two different natural resources. The OT 
deposit’s primary mineral is copper. Copper is an essential mineral for infrastructure 
development. Although the copper market is historically unstable, prices can soar with 
the increase in demand. The recent rapid Chinese industrialization increased the demand 
of copper, making copper production profitable. Therefore, Mongolia has been supplying 
more than 99% of its copper production to China for the last ten years (The Observatory 
of Economic Complexity, n.d.). 
The Khushuut’s deposit is rich with coal. Independent researchers revealed that 
Khushuut contains premium quality coking coal (Mining Technology, n.d.). Historically, 
the coal market is stable, and prices are low. Most developing countries rely on the 
affordable nature of coal for power generation and industrialization. Therefore, the 
demand for coal remains constant (World Coal Association, n.d.). Transportation costs 
also affect market price. Khushuut is located only 310km from the Yarany Border of 
Xinjiang, China where coal demand is high. Over the past five years, over 99% of 
Mongolia’s coal was exported to China (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 
n.d.). The map in Figure 3 illustrates locations of the two mines. 
In order to address the second research question, the mines were selected based on 
their difference in foreign investors. The comparative analysis is to evaluate how the 
difference in national origin of mine of ownership impact Mongolia’s development. As 
discussed in the literature review, Chinese foreign investments have a particular pattern 
when it comes to natural resources. Therefore, I chose to conduct a comparative analysis 
 36 
of Chinese-owned Khushuut coalmine, and Anglo-Australian owned OT copper mine. 
The comparative analysis will reveal whether the pattern of Chinese foreign investment 
holds in Mongolia and reveal if there are significant differences in Chinese businesses’ 
conduct towards the government when compared to Anglo-Australian investors. 
Figure 3 
Source: NPR (Langfitt) 
The Khushuut Coal Mine is owned and operated by a Chinese mining and energy 
investment holding company, Mongolian Energy Corporation (MEC). The mine is 
located in Khovd province in the Western Mongolia. The Khushuut mine is 
approximately 190 miles from the Chinese Yarant Border Station. The MEC began its 
acquisition of 330,000 hectares of the mining area in 2007 with the intent to explore and 
mine coal from the open pit mine (Daily China, 2008). In addition to the Khushuut mine, 
MEC is also owner and operator of mines located in Olon bulag and Bayan Ulgii 
provinces of Western Mongolia. The Khushuut mine is considered the second largest coal 
deposit in Mongolia, following Tavan Tolgoi coking coal mine. 
 
KHUSHUUT 
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Prior to its natural resource investments, MEC was a property investment and a 
private jet service corporation called the New World CyberBase Limited 
(NWCB)(Mongolia Energy Corporation, 2007). In 2007, the company changed course to 
invest in mining coal and ferrous and non-ferrous metals resource in Western Mongolia 
and Xinjiang, China. Figure 4 illustrates the structure of the MEC. The MEC began its 
exploration of the Khushuut mine in 2006 and commenced extraction in 2008. Although 
the MEC is a multiple license holder of mines in Western Mongolia, the contracts are not 
publically available. The most recent contract available to the public is the renegotiation 
of terms in 2014. The contract is between the local government of the Khovd province 
and the MEC subsidiary MoEnCo LLC. The duration of the agreement is for three years, 
from February 2014 to December 2016 (Mongolia Energy Corporation, 2014). 
At the inception of the Khushuut mine development, the MEC contracted mining 
consultant John T.Boyd Company to determine the future output of the mine. The 
investigation determined that the Khushuut mine has a coal deposit of 460 million tons 
and 141 million tons were considered premium-coking coal. Additionally, the Khushuut 
mine’s estimated lifespan is 19 years (Boyd, 2009). Currently, the MEC has eight 
licensing rights to mine Khushuut with a 100% share of the Khushuut mine. The MEC is 
required to pay local and government taxes as well as license royalties. By 2008, the 
Khushuut mine became operational with the extraction goal of 3 million ton of premium 
coal per year. In 2010, the MEC created a long-term coal supply contract with Baosteel 
Bayi. Under the contract, the MEC agreed to provide at least 9.6 million to 10 million 
tons from the year 2010 to 2020 (Mongolian Energy Corporation, 2010). 
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The OT is one of the world’s largest copper, gold and ore mines located in 
Omnogovi province within South Gobi, Mongolia. The OT is estimated to be the biggest 
copper deposit in the world. The development of the OT has been in exploration since the 
1990s, but the growth possibilities were not apparent until 2001 when Canadian Ivanhoe 
Mines became involved. In 2009, Ivanhoe Mines and Rio Tinto merged to form 
Turquoise Hill Resources and formed a cooperation agreement with the Mongolian 
government. Turquoise Hill Resources owns 66%, and the Mongolian government owns 
the remaining 34% of the mine. Within Turquoise Hill Resources, Rio Tinto controls 
51% of the share making it the manager of the OT (Jamasmie, 2012). Figure 5 illustrates 
the structure of the OT ownership. 
Figure 4                                                                                        Figure 5 
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contract renewal (Oyu Tolgoi LLC, 2009). Rio Tinto estimated that the OT's reserves 
could produce 1.2 billion pounds of copper and 650,000 ounces of gold yearly over a 
lifespan of 50 years (Els, 2013). The OT became operational by March 2010 and started 
its extraction of copper, ore, and gold. 
Limitations and Further Research Questions 
This research’s goal is to find out the impact of the mining boom in Mongolia’s 
development. The case study selected two prominent mines operating in Mongolia to 
conclude results. However, there are limitations. The methodology is limited to assessing 
primary and secondary sources available through websites and academic journals. The 
case study lacks on the ground research in Mongolia. 
The case study analyzed two mines that have been operational for six years. 
Further research is required to find out long-term effect of the extraction industry on the 
Mongolian development. Given time, more data will be available to assess the broader 
impact of the mining boom. 
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CHAPTER IV: Case Study 
Regulatory Compliance of Khushuut and Oyu Tolgoi 
The Mongolian President Elbegdorj Tsakhia has been a proponent of foreign 
direct investment to grow Mongolia’s economy. In the early 2000s, Mongolia’s mining 
boom attracted numerous foreign investors to take part in the natural wealth. The foreign 
attraction has encouraged the government to pass various mineral laws both to regulate 
and to promote foreign investment. 
In 2007, the Parliament implemented a significant mineral law to take control of 
the natural resources. Under the “Strategic Importance” law, a mineral deposit that may 
have potential impact on national security, economic and social development of the 
country at regional or national levels, or has the capability of producing greater than 5% 
of the GDP in a single year, it is identified as a mine of “Strategic Importance.” If a 
mineral deposit qualifies for any of the characteristics, the state government must have a 
certain amount of shares in the mineral deposit (Mongolian Mining Law, 2006). Under 
the said mineral law, Article 5.4 indicates that the state may hold up to 50% of the shares 
if state funds are applied for the exploration of mineral reserves. Additionally, Article 5.5 
states that the state may own up to 34% of the shares of the investment if the mine is 
determined to be of “strategic importance” and the exploration of mineral reserves were 
not funded by the state budget. The amount of investment determines the percentage 
share (Mongolian Mineral Law, 2006). In the event of a “Strategic Importance” ruling, 
the license holder and the government will negotiate government participation in 
production and profit sharing. 
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The Khushuut mine was not classified as a mineral deposit of “Strategic 
Importance” at the beginning of the operation. However, on December 6, 2012, the 
Mining Ministry of Mongolia requested information on the Khushuut mine to assess its 
qualification on strategic importance. In June 2013, the Government of Mongolia (GOM) 
announced its intent to add the Khushuut coal mine to the list of mineral deposits of 
“Strategic Importance” (Mongolian Energy Corporation “Annual Report,” 2014. pg 91). 
The parliament declared that the Khushuut mine contributes significant economic and 
social development to the country. The Khushuut mine was estimated to bring 2,514.4 
billion tukrig to local and national development through royalties, taxes, and fees. 
Additionally, the Khushuut mine’s transport infrastructure, power transmission line, 
power plants, industrial buildings, communication system and industrial water supply 
network all have a social impact on the development of Khovd province. Therefore, the 
Parliament believed that the Khushuut mine should be included under the “Strategic 
Importance” category. In the same month, the Khushuut mine stopped its operation to 
deliberate with the government. During the halt in operation, over half of the 500 staff 
became temporarily out of work. On March 31, 2014, the GOM decided to exclude the 
Khushuut mine from the “strategic importance” list because the government stated that 
the economic benefit from resuming the mine operation is valuable, and the government 
wished the mine to resume operation to generate revenue. 
In July 2009, the GOM adopted the “Mining Prohibition Law” to address 
environmental protection concerns. The law prohibits mineral exploration and extraction 
in areas of headwaters of rivers and lakes and forested areas. Additionally, any previously 
granted licensed that overlap the prohibited areas will be terminated within five months 
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of the implementation of the law.  In 2015, the government passed an amendment to the 
law and added a clause for the license holder to continue to operate in said prohibited 
areas if the license holder takes appropriate measure to restore the environment. The 
license holder must submit a request to continue its operation in prohibited areas to the 
Mongolian Ministry of Environment, Green Development and Tourism within three 
months from the effective date. The licenses can be revoked if said obligations are not 
met (Lovells, 2015). 
In 2014, the government identified four mining concessions in the Khushuut mine 
that overlapped the prohibited areas: license number 2913A, 4322A, 11888A and 
15289A. The Khushuut mine continued to operate in the mining areas due to an unclear 
boundary definition of the prohibited areas. The MEC stated that they should continue to 
mine in the specified areas until licenses are revoked, and in the event of revocation of 
license, the MEC determined that GOM should pay compensation to the MEC (Mongolia 
Energy Corporation “Annual Report”, 2014. Pg 91). As of November 2016, three of the 
four mines identified as overlapping prohibited areas continue to be operational. 
The OT agreement was signed in October 2009 and entered into force in March 
2010. On September 2011, 20 members of the Mongolian parliament petitioned the 
government to increase the government share in Turquoise Hill from 34% to 50%. The 
petition came ahead of Mongolia’s parliamentary election for June 2012 (Stanway, 
2011).  According to the cooperation agreement of 2009, contract terms can be 
renegotiated between the parties only when the initial 30-year contract term expires. 
Turquoise Hill Resources requested that the government honor the agreement. 
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In June 2011, the GOM passed Resolution 175, which stated certain land areas are 
for “state special needs.” The indicated areas are to be used for infrastructure facilities. 
As of June 2011, the GOM passed Resolution 175, which stated certain land areas are for 
“state special needs.” The indicated areas are to be used for infrastructure facilities. As of 
2011, some areas identified, as “state special needs” are under exploration and mining 
license of the OT. Turquoise Hill Resources indicated that infrastructure developed in 
some areas might adversely affect the mining and exploration process. The GOM claimed 
that if the infrastructure adversely affects the progress of OT; the GOM will be 
responsible for compensation. 
The intent to renegotiate the share dividends was raised again in October 2012. 
The deliberation of the shareholders continued into 2013 (Kosich, 2012). In addition to 
the disagreement, Turquoise Hill Resources voiced concerns about the uncertainty 
regarding the approval process and timing required to resolve the complex outstanding 
issues. The unresolved issues create uncertainty about the mine’s future and slow down 
the development process. 
In 2013, the Government of Mongolia proposed a budget that included additional 
royalty revenue from the OT. However, the 2009 OT agreement clearly indicates that the 
royalty rate is capped at 5% throughout the duration of the contract. Also, new laws 
regarding royalties made after the agreement will not apply to the OT. Turquoise Hill 
Resources claimed that any change in royalty fees requires approval from all parties 
involved in the contract (Entrée Gold Inc., 2013, pg. 6). 
In August 2013, the production of OT was delayed to resolve outstanding issues 
concerning development and operation of OT and its project financing. The GOM stated 
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that the parliament must approve the project funding. The OT temporarily halted 
production until the financial matters were resolved. On May 18, 2015, the Turquoise 
Hill Resources and GOM reinforced Investment Agreement and the Amended and 
Restated Shareholders Agreement (ARSHA) (("Amended and Restated Shareholders' 
Agreement," 2011). The agreement resolved outstanding issues from prior years and 
agreed on project funding. 
In the comparative analysis of the two mines, the OT investors, Rio Tinto and 
Ivanhoe are clearly well-established investors with a lot of experience investing in 
foreign mines. The Khushuut mine owner, the MEC is a new company that started in the 
mineral exploration business in 2007. The Turquoise Hill Resources has a clear and 
transparent method for publishing the contract agreement, independent investor’s report, 
worker safety procedures and various documents related to the operation of the mine. 
However, there is a clear lack of accessible documents from the MEC. The company puts 
out yearly financial reports but the information provided does not adequately include the 
citizen’s complaints and the effort it took to address the concerns. 
The analysis of both mines’ regulatory compliance shows that the Mongolian 
government’s instability is a big hindrance factor to the development effort of both 
mines. Since 2009, the Mongolian government passed various laws addressing economic, 
social and environmental concerns. On the one hand, due to the demands from civil 
society, the government passed legislation to ensure economic benefit is ensured at the 
national as well as the provincial level. On the other hand, the laws passed became 
increasingly conservative, making it hard for the foreign investors to purchase licensing 
rights and provided stricter guidelines for shared dividends. 
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The increasingly restrictive laws have had a discouraging effect on foreign 
investment. Many foreign investors criticized that the uncertainty of future regulatory 
system has decreased investor confidence in the country. The investment share 
disagreement between the Mongolian government and Turquoise Hill Resources caused a 
temporary halt in the production, which cost revenue for both parties. Similarly, the 
Mongolian government and the MEC disagreed over enforcing “Strategic Importance” 
law to the Khushuut mine. However, these actions were the Mongolian government’s 
effort to manage the foreign investors and to protect the national interest of Mongolia. 
The regulatory compliance analysis yields larger implications for Mongolia’s 
political environment. First, the failure to include the Khushuut mine to the “Strategic 
Importance” category indicates the MEC’s blatant disregard for the Mongolian law. The 
MEC was able to exhort economic dominance over the Mongolian law to ensure 100% 
ownership of the mine. But most importantly, the inability of the Mongolian government 
to enforce its law indicates the larger issue of “state erosion.” The government of 
Mongolia’s inability to enforce its own national law indicates a weak institution. 
Second, the majority of the conservative laws and its stronger effort of 
enforcement are due to citizen’s demand. As demonstrated in the June 2016 election, 
civil society has the power to influence parliamentary elections. The Mongolian 
government’s reaction to the citizens’ demands resulted in drafting stronger measures to 
enforce environmental protection, local level economic benefits and stronger regulations 
in foreign investment practices. Although there are instances of failure to enforce some of 
the regulations, the government is receptive to the demands of the people. Therefore, the 
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relationship between the government and the people has the political impact of  “state 
building.” 
Oyu Tolgoi and Khushuut’s Economic Impact on the Mongolian Economy 
The most important part of foreign investment is its contribution to the host 
country’s economic growth. Under the Mineral Law of Mongolia, 20% of extraction 
industry royalties go to the host province government and 10% is given to the local 
district government (Mineral Law of Mongolia, 2006). The fees provide financial 
assistance to developing regional social and economic infrastructure. Mongolian mining 
legislation requires foreign investors to sign “local-level agreements” where local civil 
society and community groups voice their interest in hosting mining explorations. The 
goal of the regulation is to contribute to the local economy of the host province directly. 
The MEC signed such an agreement with the Khovd province in 2014. Under the 
contract, the MEC is required to contribute to local economic development by contracting 
50% of the goods and services related to the mine from the local companies. 
Additionally, the MEC is required to invest US$0.6 (60 cents) per each ton of coal if 
exported coal is over 100,000 tons to the Khovd Khushuut Development Fund 
("Cooperation Agreement Between Khovd Aimag and MOENCO LLC," 2014). Also, the 
government generates revenue through taxes and royalties. A similar contract was signed 
with Turquoise Hill Resources over the OT production. The GOM gains economic 
benefit through taxes, license royalties, share dividends, and local business contracts 
("Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement - Turquoise Hill Resources," 2009). 
The economic impact of foreign investors in Mongolia is apparent in the years 
2010 and 2011 (Figure 2) (“Mongolian GDP”). The GDP rate grew to extraordinary 
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double digits during these years. In 2010 both of the mines made significant deals with 
Chinese businesses to sell coal and copper respectively. The MEC created a long-term 
coal supply contract with Baosteel Bayi and promised to provide an estimated 10 million 
tons of coal by 2020 (Asia Miner, 2010). Similarly, Turquoise Hill Resources committed 
to two large Chinese smelters to export an undisclosed sum of ore. The mining industry 
became one of the top contributors to the GDP growth.  In 2013, Mongolian National 
University and Australian economist Brian Fisher estimated that by 2020, revenue from 
OT would represent more than one-third of the Mongolian economy (Economist, 2012). 
According to data from 2010 to 2016, mining, agriculture and the service sectors 
are the biggest contributors to Mongolia’s GDP. As shown in Figure 6, the mining and 
service sectors outperformed the agriculture industry (Trading Economics, n.d.). The 
slight decrease in the mining profit was caused by the separate disagreement between the 
OT and the Khushuut mine with the GOM. The growth in the mining industry 
significantly contributes to the service sector, as the service sector benefitted from the 
business opportunities stimulated by the mining boom. The variance between the revenue 
from mining and the service industry can be attributed to the high unemployment rate in 
2016. 
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Figure 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Source: Trading Economics 
 
The Khushuut mine’s profit margins are significantly lower than OT’s profit 
margins (Rio Tinto, n.d.). The decline in the Chinese market demand for coal affected the 
MEC profit. Since coal prices are significantly lower than copper prices, the OT’s 
revenue is much higher. Also, Turquoise Hill Resources conducts a more transparent 
operation than the MEC, and yet it yields a higher profit. The OT operation shows that 
transparency and profit can go hand in hand.  
The production size of the Khushuut mine is smaller than OT. Turquoise Hill 
Resources invested estimated $6.4 billion in developing the OT. The full investment 
efforts of the Turquoise Hill Resources reaffirm the commitment of Turquoise Hill 
Resources to the OT. 
According to Rio Tinto data, OT project development brought an estimated 
US$1.4 billion revenue to the Mongolian government through taxes and fees (Rio Tinto, 
n.d.). Since the production began in 2010 for both mines, the national poverty rate has 
declined steadily. According to the World Bank data, since 2010, the national poverty 
rate dropped from 38.8% to 21.6% by 2014 (Table 1)(World Bank, 2015). While the 
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decline of national poverty is a sign of societal progress, there are disparities between the 
urban and rural residents. According to the Asia Foundation, rural residents have a 
greater poverty rate than urban residents (Theunissen, 2014). Rural residents have fewer 
employment opportunities, as the traditional herding lifestyle is no longer sustainable. 
Many rural residents lack access to quality education and skills training. 
Table 1. Mongolian Poverty Rate 
 2010 2011 2012 2014 
National Average 38.8% 33.7% 27.4% 21.6% 
Urban 33.2% 28.7% 23.3% 18.8% 
Rural 49.0% 43.2% 35.4% 26.4% 
Region     
Western 52.7% 40.5% 32.3% 26.0% 
Khangai/Highlands 51.9% 49.1% 38.5% 25.3% 
Central 29.9% 28.1% 28.2% 22.2% 
Eastern 43.3% 40.0% 33.4% 31.4% 
Ulaanbaatar 31.2% 25.8% 19.9% 16.4% 
   Source: World Bank 
 
The increase in foreign investment began in the mid-2000s. The mining boom 
attracted many foreign investors and with that, the promise of job creation. Both of the 
mines’ agreements indicate specific provisions that require employment of a certain 
percentage of Mongolian nationals. The OT is obliged to have at least 90% of employees 
be Mongolian, and the Khushuut mine requires at least 70% Mongolian citizens comprise 
the mine workforce. These provisions secure employment opportunities, but do not seem 
to have a positive effect on the employment rate. In August 2013, the Turquoise Hill 
Resources fired 1700 employees due to the disagreement with the GOM over the division 
of the mining revenue (Santhebennur, 2013). Its production has contracted, and so has its 
workforce.   
2011 and 2012 were the years when the Mongolian GDP experienced a double-
digit growth rate. The graph in Figure 7 indicates the increase in the unemployment rate 
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in 2012, rather than decrease in the unemployment rate. According to foreign investment 
proponents, increase in economic growth will improve business opportunities and create 
more jobs. On the contrary, the unemployment data from 2007 to 2016 indicates that the 
unemployment rate is the highest it has been in the last ten years (Trading Economics, 
n.d.). 
Figure 7 
Source: Trading Economics 
My analysis of the economic impact suggests that the Mongolian economy 
benefited greatly from the mining boom for approximately three years. The decrease in 
the national poverty rate due to economic growth is a notable success towards social 
progress. However, inclusive growth has been difficult to achieve. The results show that 
rural residents are reported to live under much higher poverty rate than the urban dwellers 
(World Bank, 2015). According to the 2014 data, one in four people live in poverty in 
urban areas versus one in three people in rural areas. 
The GDP growth can be attributed to the attraction of foreign investors in the 
extraction industry during the mining boom. The large profit margins from natural 
resources led the Mongolian government to prioritize extraction-led development. 
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The case study suggests that the Chinese demand for coal and Mongolian 
economic growth is positively correlated. The increase in the Chinese market demand for 
copper and coal increases the growth of the Mongolian economy. Accordingly, the 
decrease in Chinese demand can slow down the Mongolian economic growth. The GDP 
data from 2014 to 2016 proves the deduction. As indicated in the economic performance, 
the Chinese demand for such natural resources steadily declined in 2014 and plummeted 
in 2015 due to Chinese economic growth contraction, and as a consequence, the 
Mongolian GDP sharply decreased. 
The data from 2015 and 2016 demonstrate that single industry reliance is 
extremely volatile. The revenue from extraction industry can vary with any change in 
either the commodity price or the international political environment. My analysis 
indicates that the current Chinese effort to utilize alternative energy sources to coal would 
have a detrimental effect on Mongolia’s export sector. 
Furthermore, a focus on extraction-led development neglects the development of 
other exportable sectors of the economy. The data on sectors that contribute to the GDP 
indicates that the agriculture failed to develop in a meaningful way in the last five years.  
Social Impact: Civil Society in Action 
Foreign investment can bring opportunities for social development. Especially in 
a developing country, the infusion of infrastructure, technology, and skills training 
resources, bring a significant opportunity for progress. Both mines contributed to the 
infrastructural development of their host provinces. In 2011, Turquoise Hill Resources 
began its construction of electrical lines for OT development and the local community. 
The power source is connected to China’s power source (Mining.com, 2011). The 
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construction of electric power replaced the community’s traditional means of diesel-
generated electricity. The introduction of a new source of energy is far more reliable and 
delivered at a lower cost than the previous source. Additionally, it provides a more 
efficient form of energy that leads to emissions reduction. 
In 2010, the Turquoise Hill Resources constructed 97km of paved road from the 
OT mine to the Mongolia-China border. The local community can utilize the road, but 
under the agreement, the Turquoise Hill Resources can impose toll fees at any time. In 
2011, a domestic airport was built as transportation infrastructure. Additionally, as a 
worker safety measure, the OT provides housing for workers who qualify for assistance. 
In November 2016, a hospital financed by Turquoise Hill Resources opened in order to 
tend to the local and worker’s health needs (Oyu Tolgoi, 2016). 
Under the 2009 Agreement between the GOM and Turquoise Hill Resources, 
90% of the mine staff must be Mongolian nationals. Hence, the contract secured 
employment opportunities for the residents. As of May 2016, an estimated 95% of 3000 
employees were Mongolian citizens (Rio Tinto, 2016). However, in the same year, 
Mongolian national unemployment rate has been at its highest in the last decade. 
During the development and expansion of the OT, the herding community of 
Gobi raised important issues concerned with the OT’s social impact. Their complaints 
included displacement of local herders from their land, disruption of seasonal migration 
routes, and limiting access to grazing land and other natural resources required to sustain 
a traditional livelihood. In October 2012, a community of herders delivered a complaint 
to World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Insurance 
Guarantee Agency (Mines and Communities, 2012). The complaint stated that adequate 
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compensation should be provided to the displaced herders whose livelihood is 
endangered by the Turquoise Hill project. However, the herders claimed that the 
compensation provided was not appropriate to sustain their traditional way of life. The 
monetary compensation given so far is a temporary concession that does not solve long-
term issues. The herders demand access to grazing areas for their livestock and access to 
water supply in order to survive. Land and water are especially scarce in the Gobi desert 
and with the OT projects, resources are dwindling for the locals. 
The community relations between the Khushuut mine owners and the local 
community has been contested from the start. In 2010, a 14-year-old boy fell into a 
Khushuut mine’s unsecured pit filled with water and drowned while playing around the 
mine. The family brought a complaint to the MEC, but the MEC accepted no fault.  The 
MEC responded that the death was in an accident and is not the responsibility of the 
MEC. The MEC did not offer any compensation, and the case was not pursued further 
(Shuurhai, 2011). Henceforth, the MEC gained notoriety among the local people. 
The community voiced its disapproval of the Chinese company’s 100% 
ownership of one of the biggest mines in Mongolia. In 2012, the residents of Khovd 
province wrote a letter to the President of Mongolia and his administration; voicing 
community disapproval of the MEC’s 100% ownership of the Khushuut mine (VIP76, 
2012). The letter indicated that 100% foreign ownership violates the Mongolian mining 
law 4.1.12 of “strategic importance.”  Although the 2012 government report noted that 
the Khushuut deposit fits the characteristics of the “strategic importance” through its 
economic contribution, it continues to be under full Chinese ownership. Additionally, the 
community argued that the MEC failed to pay local taxes in the years 2011 and 2012. 
 54 
Therefore, the community demanded that the government address the issue of “strategic 
importance” and enforce the MEC to pay the required local taxes. In the event the GOM 
does not adequately respond to the demands, the community threatened to close off the 
Khushuut road that is used to transport coal to Xinjiang border (VIP76, 2012). 
In 2012 the GOM initiated a process to include the Khushuut mine on the 
“strategic importance” list. The Khushuut mine operation was temporarily put on hold 
during the deliberation between the MEC and GOM through 2012 and 2013 (Mongolia 
Energy Corporation, 2013). In the end, the GOM decided that the Khushuut mine would 
not be listed as of “strategic importance.”  The Mongolian people demand the GOM to 
take control of the Khushuut mine, but the government responded that the economic 
benefit from mine is valuable and any further disruption to the production will hurt the 
economy. National and local sentiments indicate resentment of the government for giving 
away country’s national resource wealth. Particularly in the Khovd province, at the local 
town hall meetings, locals expressed their cynicism of the Khushuut mine’s contribution 
to the Mongolian development (Shuurhai, 2012). The lack of control over country’s 
national resources continues to the present day. In a 2016 national survey, 64.6% of the 
subjects answered that the Mongolian government should own more than 51% of foreign 
owner strategic mine deposits (Sant Maral Foundation, 2016). Furthermore, the 
respondents responded that the benefit from the mineral wealth should focus on 
improving economic development and focus on long-term social programs through 
investment in education, health, etc. 
The 2014 renegotiated contract included provisions that required the MEC to 
contribute to local development. Under the 7.9 clause, the MEC is obligated to contribute 
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to the development of Khovd by investing in education, healthcare, culture, sports, 
tourism and the traditional herder lifestyle ("Cooperation Agreement Between Khovd 
Aimag and MOENCO LLC,” 2014). The local administration is responsible for enforcing 
the regulations.  However, the many of the locals expressed their loss of their confidence 
in the benefits of Khushuut mine (Shuurhai, 2012). 
As a public infrastructure development, the MEC built a paved road to transport 
coal to the Xinjiang Chinese-Mongolian border more efficiently. In May 2010, the MEC 
contracted 700 Chinese nationals began the construction of the “Khushuut Road.” The 
road was finished by November 2011 and became accessible to the community. 
However, the locals were required to pay a toll fee to access the Khushuut road (Bolod, 
n.d.). 
In analyzing the social impact of both mines, the Mongolian civil society’s effort 
to fight on behalf of the public is tremendously notable. The community is outspoken 
against unjust investor conduct and often addresses the GOM to present the citizens’ 
concerns. Civil society pressured the Mongolian government to enforce the “Strategic 
Importance” law to the Khushuut mine. Although it was unsuccessful, the Khovd 
province government was able to renegotiate the contract with the MEC to include 
provisions that required a contribution to the local development fund. 
Environmental Impact: Preservation of Mongolian Traditional Livelihood 
Extraction industries have a significant impact on the environment. Often, the 
effects are detrimental to a sustainable environment. In 2009, the GOM passed the 
Mining Prohibition law provided strict guidelines on protecting biodiversity and the 
water resources of Mongolia. However, in January 2015, the GOM voiced its intention to 
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weaken the environmental protection law to encourage more mining opportunities (Els, 
2013; Woolley&Gulguu, 2015). Mongolian citizens responded with hunger strikes and 
protests in the capital city. Thousands of citizens came to show support for the protest 
and over 22,000 people signed a petition to demand that the President of Mongolia 
protect Mongolia’s wildlife, ecology, and cultural heritage (Shourd & Rhoades, 2015). 
Unfortunately, the presence of both mines has threatened the traditional herders’ 
way of life through environmental degradation and competition for natural resources. 
Water management is crucial due to the location of the mine. In the Gobi desert, there is 
low average precipitation. The OT project developed a bore field to help with water 
supply and dust suppression. Also, the OT diverted the Undai River to accommodate 
project facilities. On January 2nd, 2013 seven residents of Umnugobi contacted the 
government to submit a legal complaint of the Undai River diversion project 
(Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, 2013). The residents are local herders who stated that 
the river diversion has a significant adverse effect on the traditional nomadic livelihood 
and water supply in the arid land. The river diversion can dry up other water supplies that 
stem from the Undai River, and can severely impact the already limited water supply for 
livestock and forests. The complaint includes that Turquoise Hill Resources needs the 
community and the government’s approval for the Undai River diversion. However, 
Turquoise Hill Resources claimed that the river is on the territory licensed to the 
Turquoise Hill and its flow is under a legal right to the license holder. 
In 2015, the local government representatives, complainants, and Turquoise Hill 
Resources were able to agree that it is Turquoise Hill Resources’ responsibility to re-
construct a spring that dried up due to the river diversion and provide water tanks to 
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herders affected by the diversion. Additionally, Turquoise Hill Resources promised to 
implement a water-monitoring system (A New Climate for Peace, n.d). 
The contract between the Khushuut mine and the Khovd government included 
provisions to that required the MEC to respect the environmental protection laws of the 
land. The MEC implemented a project “Green Office Guideline” that closely monitors 
the company’s mining and metal waste, plastic, and water recycling process. However, 
the local community does not believe that the Khushuut mine adequately protects the 
broader environment. The construction of the mine has increased dust storms in the area. 
The frequent dust storms have a negative effect on the residents' and the livestock’s 
health. The locals demand that the government enforce stricter environmental regulations, 
but the government fails to address the issues properly. The Khovd residents fought to 
add the Khushuut mine to the “strategic importance” mine list so that the government can 
regulate and enforce environmental protection policies, but the GOM failed to take 
control of the mine.  The inability of the government to protect the rights of the people 
left the community frustrated with the GOM. 
In regards to environmental protection, both mines fail to adequately implement 
policies that ensure corporate responsibility in addressing environmental degradation. 
The community voiced concerns of competing for scarce water supply, limited grazing 
land for livestock, poor air quality caused by raised dust and overall environmental 
degradation due to the nature of extraction industry. The government passed “Mining 
Prohibition Law” to ensure prevention of water contamination and forest degradation, but 
weak enforcement mechanisms prevent accountability. 
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
The Mongolian democratic transition changed the economic and political fabric of 
the country. In 1990, the country decided to reverse 70 years of socialism to modernize 
its economic and political policies. The goal of the newly established country was to 
stimulate economic growth and strive for social progress, with increasing its citizens’ 
living standards as the ultimate goal. Additionally, fair and democratic representation was 
adopted to ensure everyone had the equal opportunity to participate in the political 
process and had the power to challenge the government if the administration did not 
adequately ensure societal wellbeing. 
 This thesis’ research questions encompassed series of interrelated inquiries 
including 1) whether human development can be achieved through extraction industries 
2) whether the source of FDI has a strong impact on development outcomes, and 3) 
whether FDI influences state-led development efforts and decision making to the extent 
that it threatens the development of Mongolian sovereignty. 
The results showed that successful economic growth and societal progress 
depends on the government’s ability to manage resources. As a relatively young 
democracy, the research indicates that Mongolia is struggling to maintain a stable 
political environment. Mongolia’s abundant natural resources provided an opportunity for 
foreign investors to invest in developing the extraction industry. However, the 
inexperience of Mongolia’s government and a lack of regulatory procedures hindered a 
smooth partnership. The mining boom and increasing international attention forced the 
government to experiment with various investment and mining laws. Unfortunately, the 
laws were often inconsistent and without adequate clarifications for enforcement 
 59 
guidelines. The uncertain investment environment discourages foreign investors. The 
consequence of losing foreign investment can diminish economic growth and 
subsequently, the funding for social welfare programs. 
Although foreign investment can provide much economic benefit, the research 
indicated that it could also erode state sovereignty if the country has weak enforcement 
protocols. The research case study shows that the Chinese mining company undermined 
state sovereignty by its unwillingness to comply with the Mongolian  “strategic 
importance” mining law. The Chinese company was able to assert its economic 
dominance over the government to force the government to make an exception on its 
behalf. A multinational corporation with financial power to force the government to 
subvert its authority is dangerous for sovereignty. 
The relationship between the Chinese corporation and the Mongolian government 
clearly demonstrated the world systems theory in action. As the literature review 
indicated, the core countries actively undermine the periphery to ensure 
underdevelopment. The Chinese corporation’s action that undermined the Mongolian law 
clearly indicates a core country exerting its power over a periphery. If Mongolia wants to 
become a semi-periphery nation and compete in the international arena, the government 
must act to protect its sovereignty. 
A resolution can be found in Mongolia’s vibrant civil society. As demonstrated in 
the background chapter and the case study, the Mongolian public is highly active in the 
political sphere. In June 2016, the discontent with the ruling DP forced the public to oust 
the DP and vote MPP in a landslide victory as the ruling party. The civil society held the 
government accountable by participating in their civic duty through voting. Furthermore, 
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citizens saw the increasing foreign influence in the Mongolian mining industry and 
demanded laws that protect the interest of the Mongolian people and the environment. 
Consequently, the government adopted more conservative laws in the mining sector. 
Although some of the laws discouraged foreign investors, the public had the power to 
force the government to act. These actions by the citizens are the reason that they play a 
major role in the crucial  “state building” process. Civil society engagement can help 
combat government instability. 
The literature review on development theory in Chapter 2 indicated the rise of 
human development theory that prioritized societal wellbeing. Although the traditional 
neoliberal development indicator, GDP will suggest that the increase in the Mongolian 
GDP indicates development progress, the Mongolian citizens are pushing for a more 
sophisticated form of human development. They demand policies that advance societal 
wellbeing, such as better employment opportunities and environmental protection. 
The literature and the data collected clarify the economic impact of foreign direct 
investment. The data collected indicated that the economy did experience remarkable 
growth thanks to the foreign direct investment in the extraction industry. However, as 
literature indicates, resource-led development can be volatile. Mongolia’s overreliance on 
one industry is one of the indicators of a “resource curse.” Chinese demand for 
Mongolia’s copper and coal prioritized the mining industry as the main contributor to 
national economic growth. Although natural resources yield fast cash and can be 
extremely lucrative at times, it is based on market demand and the international political 
environment. Either a decrease in commodity price or change in law of a major natural 
resource importer can have a detrimental effect on an extraction-led economy.  As 
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demonstrated in Mongolia’s economy in 2015 and 2016, the decrease in China’s demand 
for copper and coal contracted Mongolia’s double-digit GDP rate. 
The government must work towards diversifying the industries that contribute to 
economic growth. The lack of development of the agriculture sector has few harmful 
consequences. First, the extraction industry is not sustainable. Eventually, the natural 
resources will be exhausted. If there is not an alternative source of revenue, the economy 
will inevitably collapse. Second, the mining sector is capital intensive and does not 
require a large workforce. The revenues from the mining industry must be invested 
towards the development of domestic industries such as agriculture. The existence of 
diverse industries can create more employment opportunities. Adequate domestic 
investment in the agriculture sector can alleviate the high unemployment rate because 
agriculture is labor intensive. The necessity of agriculture development is outside the 
scope of this thesis, however, it is an important topic for Mongolia’s food security. 
Further research can provide additional information on the benefits of encouraging 
agriculture sector. Nonetheless, considering long-term, future economic growth is 
necessary for sustainable development. 
Furthermore, the Mongolian tradition has always called for the preservation of the 
ecosystem and the creatures that live among the herders. The conservation of cultural 
heritage is an important aspect of Mongolian identity. The development of extraction 
industries has had a detrimental effect on the environment and the lifestyle of the 
traditional herders. Therefore the government of Mongolia should have a strict 
enforcement procedure on environmental protection laws that hold foreign and domestic 
investors accountable for any environmental degradation. 
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Most importantly, equal societal progress must be one of the highest priorities of 
the government. The remarkable economic growth did alleviate poverty and increased the 
overall living standard of the people. However, there are regional disparities in access to 
quality education, health care, and employment opportunity. There needs to be effective 
social programs that target rural residents to improve their living standards. The success 
of the government depends on the wellbeing of its citizens. 
According to the results of the case study, the Chinese and Anglo-Australian 
investors had a difference in regulatory compliance and corporate social responsibility. In 
regards to compliance, the Anglo-Australian investor actions were more transparent than 
the Chinese investor’s. The accessibility of documents, statistics, revenue reports and 
company information was more readily available for OT. However, there is a variable 
that the OT investors are well-established company with years of investment experience. 
On the other hand, the Chinese investors are new to the extraction industry, and the 
Khushuut mine was the first of its development projects. I argue that “inexperience” is 
not an adequate explanation for the lack of transparency. I resolve that all multimillion-
dollar corporations in the extraction industry should maintain a high standard of 
transparency, due to the inherently exploitative nature of the mining business. Therefore, 
the lack of transparency should create suspicion and mistrust in the company. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the relationship between China and Mongolia is 
complex. The Mongolian people are suspicious of the presence of Chinese investors. The 
inherent pessimism alone could have swayed the locals to have a negative attitude 
towards the Chinese mine, but the Chinese investors did not take genuine actions to build 
a relationship with the community. The death of the boy might have set the tone for all 
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future interactions, but the Chinese efforts to encourage community relationships were 
seen as a conciliatory rather than genuine. The biggest objection towards the Chinese 
presence is its 100% ownership of Mongolian natural resources. However, regarding the 
OT development, the society has had a more accepting attitude. The people did not think 
the Mongolian government had big enough shares, but it still had control of 34%. The 
Anglo-Australian investor did provide skills training, housing, and a community hospital, 
which had a positive reception from the locals. 
The OT had a bigger influence in contributing to the economy than the Khushuut 
mine. The Chinese investor was accused of not paying the appropriate amount of taxes 
for years 2011 and 2012. The Chinese actions raise more questions than praise. 
In regards to the environmental impact, the inherent nature of the extraction 
industry is destructive to the environment. Environmental degradation is a part of the 
mining business. Both mines are guilty of lacking appropriate measures to ensure 
environmental protection. The government of the host country has the responsibility to 
regulate environmental protection, but the environment destructive nature of extraction 
business makes it hard to contain the damage. 
The overall conclusion of the research indicates that Mongolia is at crossroads. 
The mining boom provides significant revenue for economic growth. However, the 
revenue is not sustainable, and it is highly volatile. The government of Mongolia needs to 
decide what kind of agent it wants to be. Now, more than ever, the Mongolian 
government has the opportunity to become one of the success stories like the “Asian 
Tigers.” Not many countries succeed with the resource-led development, but Mongolia 
has only three million people. The proper management of mining revenue and 
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willingness to invest in domestic markets can have a significant influence on the growth 
of the country. 
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